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The temporalizing of difference
CHRISTINE HELLIWELL AND BARRY HINDESS
The Australian National University, Canberra
In his inaugural lecture as Professor of History at the University of Jena in
1789, Freidrich von Schiller observed that European voyages of discovery
had provided his audience with
a spectacle which is as instructive as it is entertaining. They show us societies
arrayed around us at various levels of development, as an adult might be
surrounded by children of different ages, reminded by their example of what he
himself once was and whence he started. A wise hand seems to have preserved
these savage tribes until such time as we have progressed sufficiently in our own
civilization to make useful application of this discovery, and from this mirror to
recover the lost beginning of our race. (1972[1789]: 325)
The most striking features of this passage are, first, its suggestion that many
of Schiller’s contemporaries, living in distant parts of the world, were really
anachronisms, people who belonged to an earlier time, and, second, its refer-
ence to children, as if to say that these people were less than fully mature,
that their intellectual and moral capacities were relatively undeveloped.
This developmental view of humanity was widely shared by educated Euro-
peans of the Enlightenment era, and it has since remained remarkably influ-
ential in western social and political thought. It fosters the apprehension of
at least two kinds of difference: that between and within peoples who are
seen as being at roughly the same level (between and within, say, the
English, French and Germans) and that between peoples who are seen as
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being more and those who are seen as less mature or, as in Schiller’s case,
between those who are understood as belonging to the present and those
who are understood as remaining at various points in the past. Difference,
in this last case, is seen as a deficiency to be overcome.
This view underlies the widely observed discrepancy between the
universal principles advanced by both liberal and cosmopolitan thinkers
and their decidedly particularistic proposals for the government of the
subject peoples in European imperial possessions. James Mill’s 1825 ‘Essay
on Government’, for example, makes what seems to be a universalistic case
for the claim that representative government is the only effective means of
keeping the ruling elite under control (Mill, 1967[1825]. Yet a few years
later, giving evidence to a Parliamentary Committee in 1831, Mill presents
a radically different view, arguing that there is no reason for the people of
India to play any part in their own government. So long as the business of
government is well and cheaply performed, he argues, it is of little or no
consequence who are the people performing it. Here, as so often in western
political thought, it seems that universal principles appropriate to the
government of mature peoples are not seen as appropriate to the govern-
ment of their less mature contemporaries.
The relegation of whole peoples and ways of life to the status of
anachronisms, so clearly displayed in Schiller’s lecture and again in many
western reflections on colonial rule, is of more than merely historical
interest. The familiar social scientific discourse of modernity is predicated
on a similar move, dividing the contemporary world into portions which are
fully of our time, those which have yet to reach it and even, in some versions
of the discourse, those which have moved on to a postmodern condition.
Nor is the problem confined to academia. While direct colonial rule has long
since been abandoned by western states, the developmental perspective
which dominated much of its practice continues to inform the work of major
development agencies, the human rights and other international regimes
that constitute the contemporary equivalent of the older, European
standard of civilization in international affairs, and other aspects of the
West’s interactions with the non-western world. Susan Rose-Ackerman,
who has worked closely with the World Bank, observes in her Corruption
and Government (1999) that what counts as corruption often depends on
context: ‘one person’s bribe is another person’s gift’. Yet, while not denying
the reality of such cultural differences she aims to show ‘as an economist
. . . when the legacy of the past no longer fits modern conditions’ (p. 5).
Here, the development economist presumes to pass judgement over
contemporary cultures and practices, dividing them into elements that
belong in the modern world and those that belong in the past. An example
of a different kind appears in many American perceptions of the Islamic
world. Here is the New York Times columnist,Thomas Friedman, writing on
the need for the West to win support from moderate Muslims:
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
America and the West have potential partners in these [Islamic] countries who
are eager for us to help move the struggle to where it belongs: to a war within
Islam over its spiritual message and identity, not a war with Islam . . . [but] a war
between the future and the past, between development and underdevelopment,
between authors of crazy conspiracy theories versus those espousing rationality
. . . Only Arabs and Muslims can win this war within, but we can openly
encourage the progressives. (2002)
This passage brings out another aspect of the temporalizing of difference.
Not only is Islam divided into elements that belong to the present and those
that belong to the past, but the latter is seen as distinctly irrational.
We argue that the temporalizing of difference also infects the govern-
ment of western states themselves. Much discussion of the politics of differ-
ence starts with the claim that liberal democratic politics pays too little
attention to the significance of difference. Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural
Citizenship, for example, notes that the liberal and democratic currents of
modern political thought have ‘operated with an idealized model of the
polis in which fellow-citizens share a common descent, language and
culture’ (1995: 2). Similarly, Jim Tully’s Strange Multiplicity (1995) argues
that received understandings of the constitutional framework of govern-
ment tend to assume that a uniform set of laws and conventions for their
interpretation should apply to all members of the population. These works
belong to an influential body of literature which suggests that indigenous
peoples, ethnic minorities and other groups might be oppressed by precisely
the equality of citizenship which the rule of uniformity seems to require,
that is, by the assumption that there is, or should be, a single overarching
way of life among the citizens as a whole.
We prefer a more complex view (Helliwell and Hindess, 2002). Of course,
there are important contexts in which people are discriminated against
because their distinctive needs and concerns are not acknowledged, but
there are others in which, far from being ignored, their distinctive charac-
ter is both acknowledged and stigmatized. The contemporary stigmatization
of difference takes many forms, of course, but among the most pervasive
are those which, like the cosmopolitan views of the European Enlighten-
ment, associate many kinds of difference with a lack of civilization or
maturity. It even appears in some versions of multiculturalism. Consider the
case of Will Kymlicka, who makes a powerful liberal case for the collective
rights of indigenous peoples and other minorities. His claim is not simply
that participation in a culture is required to provide people with a mean-
ingful context for individual choice, but that they must participate in a
culture of a very special kind, which he calls a ‘societal culture’:
that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across
the full range of human activities, including social, religious, recreational and
economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. (1995: 76)
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On the one hand, he argues that each of America’s indigenous groups, at
the time of their forcible incorporation into American society, ‘constituted
an ongoing societal culture. . . . encompassing all aspects of social life’
(p. 79). At this point in his argument, there is no necessary connection
between societal culture and modernity. On the other hand, he draws on
Ernest Gellner’s treatment of nationalism and modernity to argue that
societal cultures and the individual liberty which, in his view, they alone can
sustain are essentially features of modern – that is, liberal democratic –
states (76–7). Here, it seems, societal culture is essentially a product of
‘modernization’, and the features Kymlicka attributes to societal culture are
simply not to be found either in pre-modern conditions or, indeed, in many
contemporary cultures, including those of indigenous minorities.
The perception that some groups are considerably less advanced than
others, and consequently that the individuals who belong to them (and
perhaps even their descendants in other parts of the world) may not yet be
fit to govern themselves, clearly plays a significant part in the politics of all
modern democracies, especially in the treatment accorded to non-western
immigrants and indigenous peoples. This point allows us to suggest a more
nuanced perspective on the situation of indigenous and other disadvan-
taged minorities in contemporary western states. While, as Tully so clearly
demonstrates, their difference is effectively denied by the liberal rule of
uniformity, it is at the same time powerfully affirmed by liberalism’s histori-
cal and developmental perspective. Not only are these minorities subjected
in important respects to the damaging rule of uniformity, but they are also
treated in other respects as inferior, as not yet capable of properly managing
their own affairs.
Any solution to the problem posed by the modern experience of cultural
diversity must involve significantly more than a recognition and accommo-
dation of difference; it must also involve a reform of attitudes towards, and
practices for dealing with, the commonplace view that certain types of
person and ways of life are caught in the past.
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When difference becomes an instrument of
social regulation
CHUA BENG-HUAT
National University of Singapore
The histories of discrimination and exclusion of non-white migrant com-
munities in developed countries of the West have given rise to the follow-
ing demands: (a) recognition of the different groups’ contributions to the
respective nation’s past; (b) respect for cultural differences of the different
groups to be legally recognized and instituted through; (c) ‘multicultural-
ism’ as national cultural policy. All these demands can be justified within
the liberal democratic promise of social equality and justice. ‘Difference’,
especially ethnic-cultural differences, is thus a code word for the larger issue
of redressing historical injustices.
The demands are often resisted. Simplistic arguments against ‘multi-
culturalism’ suggest that it undermines national unity which is, supposedly,
built on ‘shared’ values. In reality shared values are insufficient for national
unity. On the other hand, value differences between groups do not necess-
arily lead to national disunity. More sophisticated arguments find common
ground within the liberal principle of equality of individuals. This
demands that the state and its public policies be ‘difference blind’ to avoid
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